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Abstract
Our goal was to study how people understand the negation of counterfactuals (such as “Antonio denied/said that it is false 
that if Messi had played, then Barcelona would have won”) and semifactuals (such as “Antonio denied that even if Messi 
had played, Barcelona would have won”). Previous studies have shown that participants negated basic conditionals using 
small-scope interpretations by endorsing a new conditional with the negated consequent, but also by making large-scope 
interpretations, endorsing a conjunction with the negated consequent. Three experiments showed that when participants were 
asked whether the negation of a counterfactual (Experiments 1 and 2) or semifactual (Experiment 3) conditional was followed 
by a new conditional, they made a small-scope interpretation, endorsing the same conditional with the negated consequent 
(e.g., “if/even if Messi had played, Barcelona would not have won”). However, they also accepted the conditional with the 
negated antecedent for semifactuals (e.g., “even if Messi had not played, Barcelona would have won”). When participants 
were asked whether the negation of a counterfactual or semifactual conditional is followed by a conjunction, they endorsed 
the conjunction with both the negated antecedent and the consequent (e.g., “Messi did not play and Barcelona did not win”), 
but again they accepted the conjunction with the negated antecedent only for semifactuals (e.g., “Messi did not play and 
Barcelona did win”). These results have implications for the main theories of reasoning.
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Introduction
Negation has an important functional role in natural human 
language. All languages have grammatical markers of nega-
tion and children from 2 years old are able to properly under-
stand and produce negative statements (Horn, 2001). In spite 
of this, the literature has shown that negative sentences are 
harder to understand and reason with compared to their 
affirmative counterparts (Espino & Byrne, 2012; Khem-
lani et al., 2012, 2014; Macbeth et al., 2014, 2015, 2017; 
Moreno-Rios & Byrne, 2018; Orenes & Santamaría, 2014; 
Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972). As a result, negation contin-
ues to be mysterious and challenging for researchers study-
ing the cognitive processes underlying the comprehension 
of negation.
Negation is a syntactic operator that takes an argument 
(e.g., “if Messi had played, then Barcelona would have 
won”) and reverses its truth value. This means that if an 
argument is false, then its negation is true (e.g., “it is not 
the case that if Messi had played, then Barcelona would 
have won”) and vice versa. We can paraphrase the previ-
ous negated counterfactuals as “it is false that if Messi had 
played, then Barcelona would have won.” An important 
factor of negation that is under debate is its scope, that is, 
the argument to which the negation applies. In the exam-
ple above, “it is not the case that if Messi had played, then 
Barcelona would have won,” negation has a large scope 
because the scope of the negation is the entire conditional. 
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In contrast, in a sentence such as: “If Messi had played, then 
Barcelona would not have won,” negation has a small scope 
because the scope of negation is just the consequent of the 
conditional.
Philosophers have long tried to answer what it is that peo-
ple understand when they negate a counterfactual (Lewis, 
1973; Morato, 2017; Stalnaker, 1968; Williams, 2010), as 
have psychologists (Pfeifer & Tulkki, 2017), but there is 
still no consensus on this issue (Nickerson, 2015). Hence, 
our aim in this paper is to examine how people negate a 
counterfactual. We will start by reviewing this issue in the 
literature, presenting the two main theories of reasoning: the 
probabilistic theories and the mental model theory.
The probabilistic theory of reasoning (Evans & Over, 
2004; Oaksford & Chater, 2007, 2013; Over, 2016; Pfeifer & 
Kleiter, 2010) groups several theories (suppositional theory, 
Bayesian net, and probability logic) that share the hypothesis 
that most reasoning is from premises that are uncertain and 
that this uncertainty, or degrees of belief, in the statements 
from which we reason can be modelled in probability theory. 
However, important differences exist between these theories 
with respect to both their explanatory focus and their core 
assumptions about the meaning of conditionals (for review 
see, Manktelow, 2012; Nickerson, 2015). According to prob-
ability theories, people understand a conditional “if A then 
B” by (1) hypothetically adding A to their set of beliefs, (2) 
making some adjustments so that the resulting set is coher-
ent, then (3) assessing B in the light of this adjusted set 
of beliefs (Evans, 2007; Evans & Over, 2004; Oaksford & 
Chater, 2007). This three-step procedure is called the Ram-
sey test (Ramsey, 1990), and “it lies at the heart of many 
theories of conditional reasoning in general and counterfac-
tual reasoning in particular” (Lucas & Kemp, 2015, page 3). 
Some authors in favor of the probabilistic approach in con-
ditional reasoning predict that from the negated conditional 
“it is not the case that if Messi played, then Barcelona won,” 
the same conditional with the negated consequent “if Messi 
played, Barcelona didn’t win” follows (Handley et al., 2006; 
Pfeifer & Tulkki, 2017). This prediction has been confirmed 
in several studies (Espino & Byrne, 2012; Handley et al., 
2006; Pfeifer & Tulkki, 2017). Likewise, some advocates 
of the suppositional theory claim that certain conjunctive 
conclusions, such as “Messi played and Barcelona didn’t 
win,” should not be endorsed (Handley et al., 2006). The 
finding that participants do, in fact, judge that the conjunc-
tion “Messi played and Barcelona didn’t win” follows from 
the negation of a conditional has been described as an error 
in this view. The suppositional theory proposes that it arises 
because a simulation of “Messi played and Barcelona didn’t 
win” is consistent with the conditional’s negation (Handley 
et al., 2006).
According to the probabilistic theories, a counterfac-
tual conditional is understood in the same way as a factual 
conditional, that is, the probability of a counterfactual con-
ditional at the present time is the same as the probability 
of the corresponding factual conditional at a previous time 
(for details, see Over et al., 2007). From this assumption, the 
negation of counterfactuals should be expected to behave 
similarly to the negation of conditionals. This was the focus 
of the work of Pfeifer and Tulkki (2017), and these pre-
dictions were corroborated. However, one limitation of this 
research is that participants were provided with only two 
options (such as, “if A were the case, then B wouldn’t be 
the case” and “it is not the case that if A were the case, then 
B would be the case”) in order to negate a counterfactual. 
Other options like making conjunctive conclusions (such 
as “A were the case and B would not be the case”) were 
excluded in their experiments, given that it is considered an 
error to infer a conjunction.
An alternative to the probabilistic theories is the men-
tal model theory or model theory (Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 
2020; Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, 2002). The model 
theory proposes that when people understand a factual con-
ditional such as “If Messi played, then Barcelona won,” they 
simulate the possibilities consistent with its truth. Due to the 
limitations of working memory, they think only about the 
events mentioned at the outset (Johnson-Laird et al., 1992):
Messi played Barcelona won
                                                                                                                                                    
         …
The three dots in the diagram indicate that there may be 
other possibilities. However, people tend to make inferences 
using just the initial model. But in some circumstances, with 
enough time, motivation, etc., people flesh out their models 
to think about some others, for example:
Messi played Barcelona won
Messi did not play Barcelona won
Messi did not play Barcelona did not win
The conditional rules out the possibility that “Messi 
played and Barcelona did not win”:
Messi played Barcelona did not win
Only when people are asked to think about “it is not the 
case” with a conditional, do they represent this possibil-
ity. Actually, Khemlani et al. (2012) established that the 
core meaning of the negation of the conditional refers to 
the complement of the set referred to by that conditional. It 
follows that a sentential negation contradicts the correspond-
ing affirmation, that is, both cannot be true and false at the 
same time.
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How do people understand and think when they negate 
a conditional? According to the model theory (Khemlani 
et al., 2014), people negate a conditional in at least two dif-
ferent ways: they apply the negation to one part of the sen-
tence (small scope negation) or they apply it to the entire 
sentence (large scope negation). Participants prefer to use 
the first way if possible. Actually, “the mental model pos-
tulates that there is a processing heuristic for negation to 
be interpreted, where possible, as having a small scope” 
(Khemlani et al., 2012, page 544). The main reason for this 
is that the small scope interpretation reduces the number of 
mental models to be represented. Thus, in this case, people 
often apply negation in the main clause of the conditional 
assertion, e.g., “if Messi played then Barcelona did not win,” 
and interpret the negation of a conditional, e.g., “it is not 
the case that if Messi played, then Barcelona won,” as the 
small scope negation. However, the possibility “if Messi 
played then Barcelona did not win” does not contradict its 
corresponding affirmation. Model theory predicts that “the 
meaning, reference, and knowledge can modulate the core 
interpretation of negation so that a negative can be merely 
contrary to its corresponding affirmative assertion” (Khem-
lani et al., 2012).
The second way in which people negate a conditional is 
by using the large scope interpretation. In this case, people 
have to carry out two operations: the enumerative negation 
process and the comparative process (Khemlani et al., 2014). 
The first process produces different possibilities by affirm-
ing or negating the elements of the initial model possibility. 
The second process tests whether any of the possibilities are 
inconsistent with the affirmative conditional. People begin 
by enumerating the negation of both clauses (Khemlani 
et al., 2012): “Messi did not play and Barcelona did not 
win.” This possibility is consistent with one of the possi-
bilities of the affirmative conditional, therefore they discard 
it and continue with the enumerative processing. Next, the 
possibility “Messi did not play and Barcelona won” is enu-
merated, and again, it is consistent with one of the possibili-
ties of the affirmative conditional, so it is not accepted. Then, 
the possibility “Messi played and Barcelona did not win” is 
enumerated, but it is not consistent with any of the three pos-
sibilities of the affirmative conditional. Finally, they enumer-
ate the possibility “Messi played and Barcelona won” and it 
is consistent with the affirmative conditional, therefore it is 
rejected. Hence, participants determine that the possibility 
in which the negation holds is “Messi played and Barcelona 
did not win.” Therefore, the large scope negation of the con-
ditional may lead them to accept the conjunctive possibility 
“Messi played and Barcelona did not win,” while the small 
scope negation leads people to accept the conditional “if 
Messi played then Barcelona did not win.” According to 
the model theory, the first conclusion is correct while the 
second one is incorrect. Data from different research shows 
that people frequently accept both conclusions (Espino & 
Byrne, 2012; Handley et al., 2006).
However, the enumerative process is not always complete 
(see also Khemlani et al., 2014), and, therefore, people do 
not always negate the conditional correctly, given that they 
do not usually flesh out the implicit models and represent 
just the initial model “Messi played and Barcelona won” in 
their understanding of a conditional. Thus, when they enu-
merate the possibility “Messi did not play and Barcelona did 
not win,” they realise that it is the one possibility in which 
the negation holds, because it is not present in the initial 
model. Some people may stop the enumerative process here, 
given that it is time-consuming, and conclude that this is the 
only possibility for the negation of the conditional.
According to model theory, how do people understand 
and reason with the negation of counterfactuals? Let us start 
by explaining how people understand and reason with coun-
terfactuals (from a review, Byrne, 2016). The model theory 
proposes that when people understand a counterfactual con-
ditional, such as “if Messi had played, then Barcelona would 
have won,” they envisage two possibilities: the conjecture 
(the imagined possibility), for example, “Messi played and 
Barcelona won,” and its opposite, the presupposed facts (the 
factual possibility), for example, “Messi did not play and 
Barcelona did not win” (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002):
Presupposed Fact : Messi did not play Barcelona did not win
Conjectured possibility : Messi played Barcelona won
…
The initial representation for a counterfactual is different 
in two ways from conditionals: there are two initial models 
instead of one and there are two epistemic labels (Byrne 
& Johnson-Laird, 2020; Espino & Byrne, 2020). The first 
model, for example, “Messi did not play and Barcelona 
did not win,” is a presupposed fact. The second model, for 
example, “Messi played and Barcelona won,” as in the con-
ditional, is a conjectured possibility with other possibilities 
represented by the three dots and not explicitly represented 
(e.g., “Messi did not play and Barcelona won”). People can 
flesh out their models to think about some of them, for exam-
ple: “Messi did not play and Barcelona won” and “Messi 
did not play and Barcelona did not win.” Although counter-
factuals have two initial models and conditionals only one, 
after fleshing out all the models, their full set of consistent 
possibilities is the same (e.g., Byrne & Johnson-Laird, 2020; 
Espino & Byrne, 2018). Consequently, the complementary 
possibility is also the same: for example, “Messi played and 
Barcelona did not win,” which is the core meaning of nega-
tion of a counterfactual.
The proposal that from a counterfactual, people think of 
two possibilities from the outset were corroborated by find-
ings such as that they make the modus tollens inference more 
 Memory & Cognition
1 3
readily from a counterfactual than from a factual conditional 
(Byrne & Tasso, 1999) or that they read the conjunction 
“There were no apples and there were no oranges” more 
quickly when they are primed by the counterfactual “if there 
had been apples, then there would have been oranges” com-
pared to the factual conditional “If there are apples, then 
there are oranges” (Santamaría et al., 2005). According to 
model theory, the meanings of factual and counterfactual 
conditionals run in parallel, but their initial mental models 
differ because they have different epistemic status (Byrne & 
Johnson-Laird, 2020). Although the epistemic status of some 
mental models is different between factual conditionals and 
counterfactuals, the theory does not state how this may influ-
ence people’s understanding and reasoning when they negate 
conditionals or counterfactuals, and consequently the theory 
of mental models would make the same predictions for a 
negated counterfactual as for a negated factual conditional.
The main goal of this research is to explore what infer-
ences people endorse when they negate a counterfactual. 
Unlike Pfeifer and Tulkki’s (2017) research in which only 
a small range of conclusions (such as, “if A were the case, 
then B wouldn’t be the case” or “it is not the case that if 
A were the case, then B would be the case”) was used, in 
our experiments we present the full set of counterfactual 
conclusions and conjunctive conclusions. This procedure 
was previously used by Handley et al. (2006) and Espino 
and Byrne (2012) to discover how people think when they 
negate a conditional. This procedure will allow us to find 
out what type of counterfactual and conjunctive conclusions 
participants are willing to accept from a negated counterfac-
tual. It is crucial to know how people behave with negated 
counterfactuals, not only to understand how people reason 
with counterfactuals, but also in order to distinguish between 
competing explanations of the cognitive processes underly-
ing counterfactual reasoning and negation.
Experiment 1: The denied counterfactuals
The goal of this experiment was to explore what inferences 
people endorse when a counterfactual is negated. In order 
to negate the counterfactual, we used the word “deny.” This 
experiment examined the full set of counterfactual and con-
junctive conclusions that people judge can follow the nega-
tion of a counterfactual, such as “Last year in a conversation 
about football, Antonio denied that if Messi had played, then 
Barcelona would have won.” We examined all four possible 
counterfactual conclusions one by one: “if Messi had played, 
then Barcelona would have won,” “if Messi had played, then 
Barcelona wouldn't have won,” “if Messi hadn't played, then 
Barcelona would have won” and “if Messi hadn't played, 
then Barcelona wouldn't have won.” We also examined all 
four possible conjunctive conclusions: “Messi played and 
Barcelona won,” “Messi played and Barcelona didn't win,” 
“Messi didn't play and Barcelona won,” and “Messi didn't 
play and Barcelona didn't win.”
The model theory (Khemlani et al., 2012, 2014) and the 
probabilistic theory (Pfeifer & Tulkki, 2017) predict that 
from a negated counterfactual (such as “Antonio denied that 
if Messi had played, then Barcelona would have won”), par-
ticipants will infer the same counterfactual with affirmative-
antecedent and negated-consequent (such as “if Messi had 
played, then Barcelona wouldn't have won”). Both theories 
predict that participants will more frequently choose the con-
clusion with the counterfactual with affirmative-antecedent 
and negated-consequent (such as “if Messi had played, then 
Barcelona wouldn't have won”) than the conclusion with 
negated-antecedent and affirmative-consequent (such as “if 
Messi had not played, then Barcelona would have won”) 
or negated-antecedent and negated-consequent (such as “if 
Messi had not played, then Barcelona would not have won”) 
or affirmative-antecedent and affirmative-consequent (such 
as “if Messi had played, then Barcelona would have won”).
Moreover, according to the model theory (Khemlani 
et al., 2014), if participants reason correctly from a negated 
counterfactual, they should more frequently infer a conjunc-
tion with affirmative-antecedent and negated-consequent 
(such as “Messi played and Barcelona did not win”) than a 
conjunction with negated-antecedent and affirmative-conse-
quent (such as “Messi did not play and Barcelona won”) or 
negated-antecedent and negated-consequent (such as “Messi 
did not play and Barcelona did not win”) or affirmative-ante-




MorePower (6.0.4) Software (Campbell & Thompson, 
2012) showed that to achieve 85% power for the effect size 
obtained in a previous study (ηp2 = .085; Espino & Byrne, 
2012) with alpha < .05 for 2 × 4 ANOVA, it was necessary 
to have a sample size of 46 participants in this and the fol-
lowing experiments. The 52 participants in this experiment 
were undergraduates at the University of La Laguna, Tener-
ife, Spain and were native speakers of Spanish. There were 
45 women and 7 men and their average age was 20 years, 
range 18–31 years. The experiment received ethical approval 
from the Comité de Ética de la Investigación y Bienestar 
animal (Committee on Ethics in Research and Animal Wel-
fare, University of La Laguna) prior to its commencement. 
None of the participants had received instruction in logic nor 
had they taken part in similar experiments.
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Design, materials, and procedure
We constructed 24 problems that contained a denied coun-
terfactual, such as “Antonio denied that if Messi had played, 
then Barcelona would have won” (see Appendix 1. Experi-
mental Materials). Each counterfactual was followed by one 
of the eight possible conclusions. There were one of the 
four counterfactual conclusions (e.g., “if Messi had played, 
then Barcelona would have won,” “if Messi had played, then 
Barcelona wouldn't have won,” “if Messi hadn't played, then 
Barcelona would have won,” and “if Messi hadn't played, 
then Barcelona wouldn't have won”) and four conjunc-
tive conclusions (e.g., “Messi played and Barcelona won,” 
“Messi played and Barcelona didn't win,” “Messi didn't play 
and Barcelona won,” and “Messi didn't play and Barcelona 
didn't win”). Each problem was instantiated in three different 
conversational topics: football (“Messi played and Barcelona 
won”), diseases (“the government closed the border and con-
trolled the coronavirus”), and investments (“football clubs 
invested more money in improving facilities and more fans 
attended football matches”), that is, 24 problems in total. In 
each problem the antecedent of the counterfactual was an 
action (e.g., “Messi played”) and the consequent was a pos-
sible result of this action (e.g., “Barcelona won”). So each 
participant saw each of the three counterfactual conditionals 
eight times, each time associated with a different conclusion 
(counterfactual conditional or conjunction). Each conclusion 
– either counterfactual or conjunction – was the combina-
tion of affirmed or denied antecedent and consequent. The 
participants’ task was to evaluate whether or not a conclu-
sion followed from the denied counterfactual. An example 
of their task is as follows:
Last year in a conversation about football, Antonio 
denied that if Messi had played, then Barcelona would 
have won.
From this statement one can necessarily conclude that:
If Messi had played, then Barcelona would not have 
won.
YES[ ]NO [ ]
Participants were instructed that their task was to decide 
whether the proposed conclusion followed from the premise. 
In order to choose the conclusion, they had to pick YES or 
NO. The task was presented online using PsyToolkit (Stoet, 
2010, 2017) and the problems were presented in a differ-
ent random order to each participant, with the problems 
presented one by one. Participants received the following 
instructions in the first presentation online:
“This task is designed to test your understanding of 
logical rules. On the following pages you will be pre-
sented with a series of problems. In each problem, a 
rule will be presented, followed by a conclusion. For 
each problem you must indicate whether or not the 
conclusion necessarily follows, given the rule that 
precedes it. If you think that the conclusion follows 
the rule, you should select the option “yes,” if you 
think that the conclusion does not follow the rule, you 
should select the option “no.” A conclusion is neces-
sarily true when the conclusion must follow, given the 
truth of the rule.”
Results and discussion
The data for this experiment and the subsequent ones are 
available online at OSF https:// osf. io/ 3frkg/? view_ only= 
dad4c b0128 7b4e0 3bafe 5c46c 1ca0c 60. We carried out a 2 
(conclusion connective: counterfactual, conjunction) × 4 
(conclusion polarity: A B, A not-B, not-A B, not-A not-B) 
repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the 
“yes” responses, using a Greenhouse Geisser correction for 
the violation of sphericity assumption. There was no main 
effect of conclusion connective, F(1, 51) = .34, MSE = .06, 
p = .56, ηp2 = .01; a main effect of conclusion polarity, 
F(2.603, 132.773) = 11.51, MSE = .16, p < .001, ηp2 = .18, 
and the two variables interacted, F(2.399, 122.367) = 15.67, 
MSE = .11, p < .001, ηp2 = .24. The interaction showed that 
people accepted the counterfactual conclusion “If A, then 
not-B” more often than the counterfactual “if A, then B” 
(51% vs. 21%; F(1, 51) = 16.65, MSE = .15, p < .001, ηp2 
= .25), “if not-A, then B” (51% vs. 26%; F(1, 51) = 13.39, 
MSE = .13, p = .001, ηp2 = .21), and “if not-A, then not-
B” (51% vs. 33%; F(1, 51) = 5.19, MSE = .17, p = .027, 
ηp2 = .07). Appendix 2 shows the rest of the comparison. 
Participants accepted the conjunctive conclusion “not-A and 
not-B” more often than the conjunctive “A and B” (63% vs. 
19%; F(1, 51) = 39.76, MSE = .13, p < .001, ηp2 = .44), “A 
and not- B” (63% vs. 24%; F(1, 51) = 30.23, MSE = .13, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .37) and “not-A and B” (63% vs. 30%; F(1, 
51) = 22.58, MSE = .12, p < .001, ηp2 = .31). Appendix 2 
shows the rest of the comparison (see Table 1).
Experiment 1 showed that from the denied counter-
factuals, participants mostly infer two conclusions. First, 
when they have to evaluate whether or not a counterfac-
tual conclusion follows from a denied counterfactual, 
they more frequently infer a counterfactual conclusion 
Table 1  Percentages of “yes” responses that people infer from the 
denied counterfactuals (“X denied that if they had performed action 
A, then B would have happened”) in Experiment 1
Conclusion polarity: A B A not-B not-A B not-A not-B
Conclusion connective:
Counterfactual 21 51 26 33
Conjunction 19 24 30 63
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with affirmative-antecedent and negated-consequent (If 
A, then not-B) than other conclusions (affirmative-ante-
cedent and affirmative-consequent, negated-antecedent 
and affirmative-consequent, and negated-antecedent and 
negated-consequent). These results can be predicted by the 
model theory (Khemlani et al., 2012, 2014) and the proba-
bilistic logic theory (Pfeifer & Tulkki, 2017), although 
there are marked theoretical differences between these 
authors when it comes to explaining why people infer a 
counterfactual with the negated consequent from a negated 
counterfactual.
Second, when participants have to evaluate whether or 
not a conjunctive conclusion follows from a denied coun-
terfactual, they more frequently infer a conjunctive con-
clusion with negated-antecedent and negated-consequent 
than other conjunctive conclusions (affirmative-antecedent 
and affirmative-consequent, affirmative-antecedent and 
negated-consequent, and negated-antecedent and affirma-
tive-consequent). These results are problematic for those 
theories that claim people use the Ramsey test in order to 
infer a conclusion (Suppositional theory, and Probabilis-
tic logic). Initially these results could be problematic for 
model theory if it is assumed that people have reasoned 
correctly. According to the model theory, if people have 
reasoned correctly, they should accept the conjunctive 
conclusion “A and not-B” as correct (Byrne & Johnson-
Laird, 2020). However, Khemlani et  al. (2012, 2014) 
proposed that participants tend to start the enumerative 
process by negating the two clauses (e.g., “Messi did not 
play and Barcelona did not win”). If this were the case, 
participants would have discarded this result as the nega-
tion of a counterfactual, given that this possibility matches 
one initial model of the counterfactual, the presupposed 
fact. Instead, it was the most accepted conclusion. Later, 
we offer a hypothesis based on a heuristic strategy that 
explains why people accept the conjunctive conclusion 
“not-A and not-B” from the negated counterfactual. The 
hypothesis we offer is compatible with the principles of 
model theory, but not with probabilistic logic theory.
Experiment 2: The false counterfactuals
Khemlani et al. (2012) have referenced two important ways 
of interpreting negation: (1) as denial: to deny preconcep-
tions, and (2) as falsity: to reverse the true value of a sen-
tence (see Khemlani et al., 2012). In the same way, Over-
steegen and Schilperoord (2014) mentioned “denial” and 
“falsity” as two kinds of negations. In Experiment 1 we used 
the first kind of negation: “Someone denies.” In order to test 
whether the results were generalized to expressions corre-
sponding to the second type of negation: “Someone said it 
is false,” we decided to add Experiment 2. So the motivation 
of this experiment was to replicate the results of Experiment 




The 50 participants in this experiment were undergraduates 
at the University of La Laguna, Tenerife, Spain and were 
native speakers of Spanish. There were 42 women and 8 
men and their average age was 22 years, range 18–53 years. 
The experiment received ethical approval from the Comité 
de Ética de la Investigación y Bienestar Animal (Committee 
on Ethics in Research and Animal Welfare, University of La 
Laguna) prior to its commencement. None of the partici-
pants had received instruction in logic nor had they taken 
part in similar experiments.
Design, materials, and procedure
Design, materials, and procedure were similar to Experiment 
1, with the only exception being the replacement of “deny” 
with “it is false.”
Results and discussion
We carried out a 2 (conclusion connective: counterfactual 
and conjunction) × 4 (conclusion polarity: A B, A not-B, 
not-A B, not-A not-B) repeated-measures analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) on the “yes” responses, using a Greenhouse 
Geisser correction for the violation of the sphericity assump-
tion. There was no main effect of conclusion connective, 
F(1, 49) = .49, MSE = .05, p = .49, ηp2 = .01; a main effect 
of conclusion polarity, F(1.630, 79.864) = 15.80, MSE = 
.25, p < .001, ηp2 = .24, and the two variables interacted, 
F(2.007, 98.364) = 36.46, MSE = .10, p < .001, ηp2 = .43. 
The interaction showed that people accepted the counter-
factual conclusion “If A, then not-B” more often than the 
counterfactuals “if A, then B” (59% vs. 21%; F(1, 49) = 
27.77, MSE = .14, p < .001, ηp2 = .36), “if not-A, then B” 
(59% vs. 23%; F(1, 49) = 45.96, MSE = .07, p < .001, ηp2 
Table 2  Percentages of “yes” responses that people infer from the 
false counterfactuals (“X said it is false that if they had performed 
action A, then B would have happened”) in Experiment 2
Conclusion polarity: A B A not-B not-A B not-A not-B
Conclusion connective:
Counterfactual 21 59 23 25
Conjunction 11 28 28 67
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= .48), and “if not-A, then not-B” (59% vs. 25%; F(1, 49) = 
23.83, MSE = .12, p < .001, ηp2 = .33). Appendix 2 shows 
the rest of the comparison. Participants accepted the con-
junctive conclusion “not-A and not-B” more often than the 
conjunctives “A and B” (67% vs. 11%; F(1, 49) = 106.47, 
MSE = .08, p < .001, ηp2 = .69), “A and not-B” (67% vs. 
28%; F(1, 49) = 21.68, MSE = .18, p < .001, ηp2 = .31), 
and “not-A and B” (67% vs. 28%; F(1, 49) = 18.81, MSE = 
.21, p < .001, ηp2 = .28). Appendix 2 shows the rest of the 
comparisons (see Table 2).
Experiment 2 replicates the results obtained in Experi-
ment 1. Although the two expressions could induce different 
kinds of negation (see Khemlani et al., 2012; Oversteegen & 
Schilperoord, 2014) (the one used in Experiment 1 related 
to denying while the one used in Experiment 2 related to 
falsity), participants’ inferences negating counterfactuals 
followed the same pattern. Experiment 2 showed that from 
a false counterfactual, participants mostly infer two conclu-
sions. First, when they have to evaluate whether or not a 
counterfactual conclusion follows from a false counterfac-
tual, they more frequently infer a counterfactual conclusion 
with affirmative-antecedent and negated-consequent (“If A, 
then not-B”) than other counterfactual conclusions (affirm-
ative-antecedent and affirmative-consequent, affirmative-
antecedent and negated-consequent, and negated-antecedent 
and negated-consequent). As in Experiment 1, these results 
can be predicted by the model theory (Khemlani et al., 2012; 
Stalnaker, 1968) and the probabilistic logic theory (Pfeifer 
& Tulkki, 2017).
Second, when participants have to evaluate whether or not 
a conjunctive conclusion follows from a false counterfactual, 
they more frequently infer a conjunctive conclusion with 
negated-antecedent and negated-consequent (such as “not-A 
and not-B”) than other conjunctive conclusions (affirmative-
antecedent and affirmative-consequent, affirmative-anteced-
ent and negated-consequent, and negated-antecedent and 
affirmative-consequent). As in Experiment 1, these results 
are not predicted by theories that claim people use the Ram-
sey test in order to infer a conclusion (Suppositional theory 
and Probabilistic logic). Moreover, these results do not fit the 
predictions of the model theory either, since if people had 
reasoned correctly with false counterfactuals, they would 
have chosen the conjunctive conclusion with affirmative-
antecedent and negated-consequent (such as, “A and not-B”).
How then can we explain these results? Counterfactual 
conditionals and basic conditionals tell us about the conjec-
tured possibilities, but in addition, counterfactual condition-
als tell us about a presupposed fact. Therefore, a counterfac-
tual is similar to a basic conditional but with two epistemic 
realities instead of just one. The interpretation of the nega-
tion could lie in thinking that only one of the two realities 
is possible. It can be made by discarding the conjectured 
possibilities and accepting the presupposed fact (“not-A and 
not-B”) as the negation of the counterfactuals. But there is 
another way: discarding the presupposed fact and negating 
the conditional as a basic conditional (see Table 3). If people 
choose to proceed the first way, they reject the conjecture 
and accept the fact. Note that it is more difficult for the fact 
to mutate, since there are no alternatives, and therefore peo-
ple conclude with the fact “not-A and not-B” as the negation 
of the counterfactual. For example, when people read the 
negated counterfactual “it is not the case that if Messi had 
Table 3  Strategies people use in negating counterfactual and semifactual conditionals
Counterfactual
“It is not the case that if Messi had played, 
Barcelona would have won”
Semifactual
“It is not the case that even if Messi had played, 
Barcelona would have won”














Deny by discarding the conjecture and 
accepting the fact
Not-A Not-B
“Messi did not play and Barcelona did not win”
Not-A B
“Messi did not play and Barcelona won”
Deny by discarding the fact and enumerat-
ing cases to test with representations
With initial representations:
Not-A Not-B
“Messi did not play and Barcelona did not win”






“Messi did not play and Barcelona did not win”
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played, Barcelona would have won” they assume that the 
conjectured possibilities are false, discarding all the pos-
sibilities (such as “Messi played and Barcelona won”) and 
accepting the factual possibility: “Messi did not play and 
Barcelona did not win.”
If people choose the second way to proceed, the negation 
of a counterfactual is equivalent to the negation of a basic 
conditional “it is not the case that if Messi played, Barcelona 
won,” given that the factual possibility is discarded. Partici-
pants operate only with the conjectured possibility (“Messi 
played and Barcelona won”) and they know that there are 
other implicit alternatives (implicit models). Thus, denying 
a counterfactual leads to the same result as denying a condi-
tional: participants could carry out an incomplete enumera-
tion process and accept the “not-A and not-B” case. The enu-
merative negation process starts with the negation of each 
clause of the negated conditional: for example, “Messi did 
not play and Barcelona did not win.” This possibility is not 
consistent with the conjecture (“Messi played and Barcelona 
won”) and therefore many participants will conclude that 
this possibility is the negation of the conditional and stop the 
enumerative process. Only some participants will notice that 
it is indeed consistent, if they flesh out the implicit models. 
In this case, they will continue with the enumerative process, 
negating one of the two clauses. In any case, if they continue 
the enumerative process, they will apply the negation to only 
one of the two clauses. The possibility “Messi played and 
Barcelona did not win” is inconsistent with the conjectured 
models, and therefore, participants could conclude that this 
case is consistent with the negation of the conditional. In 
both cases the most frequent expected response is the same: 
“not-A and not-B.” Therefore, using counterfactuals, it is not 
possible to distinguish between the two explanations (see 
Table 3). The reason is that the factual possibility and the 
possibility generated from the partial enumerative process-
ing are the same. This does not happen with semifactual 
conditionals, which have a different factual possibility. In 
Experiment 3, we will replace the counterfactual conditional 
with the semifactual conditional.
Experiment 3: The denied semifactuals
According to the model theory, when people understand a 
semifactual conditional such as “even if Messi had played, 
Barcelona would have won,” they envisage dual possibili-
ties, that is, they construct a model corresponding to the 
conjectured possibility, “Messi played and Barcelona won,” 
and one corresponding to the factual possibility (the pre-
supposed fact), “Messi did not play and Barcelona won” 
(Byrne, 2016):
Presupposed Fact: Messi did not play Barcelona won
Conjectured possibility: Messi played Barcelona won
…
Experiment 3 will be conducted to test the two strate-
gies based on the epistemic status derived from the mental 
model theory. They involve (1) discarding the presupposed 
fact and proceeding with the conjecture and implicit possi-
bilities as with basic conditionals. In this case, given that the 
only model that differs between counterfactuals and semi-
factuals is the discarded model, the negation of semifactuals 
will lead to the same results as the negation of counterfac-
tual conditionals. Therefore, as in Experiments 1 and 2, the 
“not-A and not-B” conjunction will be the one most fre-
quently chosen (e.g., “Messi did not play and Barcelona did 
not win”). However, if participants use the second strategy, 
a different result is predicted: (2) the most mutable possibil-
ity (the conjecture) is discarded and participants conclude 
with the factual possibility “not-A and B” (e.g., “Messi did 
not play and Barcelona won”). As predicted by the mental 
model theory and probabilistic theories, participants will 
apply the small scope strategy when possible, negating the 
main clause. Thus, they would prefer to conclude that the 
negation of the semifactual, i.e., “even if Messi had played, 
Barcelona would have won” is “even if Messi had played, 
Barcelona would not have won.”
Method
Participants
The 83 participants in this experiment were undergradu-
ates at the University of Granada, Spain and were native 
speakers of Spanish. There were 66 women and 17 men 
and their average age was 19 years, range 17–50 years. 
The experiment received ethical approval from the Comité 
de Ética en Investigación Humana (Committee on Ethics 
in Human Research, Universidad of Granada, R.N. 1068/
CEIH/2020). None of the participants had received instruc-
tion in logic nor had they taken part in similar experiments.
Design, materials, and procedure
Design, materials, and procedure were similar to Experiment 
1, with the only exception being that counterfactual expres-
sions were replaced by semifactuals.
Results and discussion
We carried out a 2 (conclusion connective: semifactual and 
conjunction) × 4 (conclusion polarity: A B, A not-B, not-A 
B, not-A not-B) repeated-measures analysis of variance 
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(ANOVA) on the “yes” responses, using a Greenhouse Geis-
ser correction for the violation of the sphericity assumption. 
There was a main effect of conclusion connective, F(1, 82) 
= 41.00, MSE = .04, p < .001, ηp2 = .33; a main effect of 
conclusion polarity, F(2.281, 170.660) = 9.99, MSE = .23, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .11, and the two variables interacted, F(2.908, 
203.59) = 9.83, MSE = .09, p < .001, ηp2 = .12. The interac-
tion showed that people accepted the conclusion “even if A, 
not-B” more often than the conclusions “even if A, B” (58% 
vs. 33%; F(1, 82) = 14.02, MSE = .20, p < .001, ηp2 = .15), 
and “even if not-A, not-B” (58% vs. 27%; F(1, 82) = 41.38, 
MSE = .10, p < .001, ηp2 = .34). Also they accepted the con-
clusion “even if not-A, B” more often than the conclusions 
“even if A, B” (52% vs. 33%; F(1, 82) = 22.71, MSE = .07, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .22), and “even if not-A, not-B” (52% vs. 27%; 
F(1, 82) = 19.33, MSE = .13, p < .001, ηp2 = .19). They 
accepted the conclusion “even if A, not-B” as frequently as 
“even if not-A, B” (58% vs. 52%; F(1, 82) = .85, MSE = .20, 
p = .36, ηp2 = .01) and they accepted the conclusion “even if 
A, B” as frequently as “even if not-A, not-B” (33% vs. 27%; 
F(1, 82) = .99, MSE = .11, p = .32, ηp2 = .01).
As we predicted, they accepted the conjunctive conclu-
sion “not-A and not-B” as frequently as the conclusion 
“not-A and B” (45% vs. 46%; F(1, 82) = .07, MSE = .16, p 
= .80, ηp2 < .001) but more frequently than the conclusion 
“A and B” (45% vs. 16%; F(1, 82) = 30.84, MSE = .11, p 
< .001, ηp2 = .27), and “A and not-B” (45% vs. 22%; F(1, 
82) = 19.35, MSE = .11, p < .001, ηp2 = .19). Also, they 
accepted the conclusion “not-A and B” more frequently than 
the conclusion “A and B” (46% vs. 16%; F(1, 82) = 41.61, 
MSE = .09, p < .001, ηp2 = .34), and “A and not-B” (46% 
vs. 22%; F(1, 82) = 25.50, MSE = .10, p < .001, ηp2 = 
.24). Finally, they accepted the conclusion “A and B” as fre-
quently as the conclusion “A and not-B” (16% vs. 22%; F(1, 
82) = 1.76, MSE = .06, p = .19, ηp2 = .02) (see Table 4).
Experiment 3 showed that from a denied semifactual, par-
ticipants infer the semifactual with affirmative-antecedent 
and negated-consequent (“even if A, not-B”) as frequently 
as the semifactual with negated-antecedent and affirmative-
consequent (“even if not-A, B”). They infer these two con-
clusions more frequently than the other two conclusions 
(“even if A, B” and “even if not-A, not-B”). Therefore, this 
experiment showed that participants apply the small-scope 
negation strategy to infer that a semifactual conclusion fol-
lows from a denied semifactual. In contrast to the denied 
counterfactual (Experiments 1 and 2), for a denied semifac-
tual they apply the small-scope negation strategy over the 
main clause (“even if A, not-B”) and over the subordinate 
clause (“even if not-A, B”).
Participants infer the conjunctive conclusion with 
negated-antecedent and negated-consequent (“not-A and 
not-B”) as frequently as the conjunctive conclusion with 
negated-antecedent and affirmative-consequent (“not-A and 
B”) from a denied semifactual. Also, they infer these two 
conjunctive conclusions more frequently than the conjunc-
tive conclusion with affirmative-antecedent and affirmative-
consequent (“A and B”) and the conjunctive conclusion with 
affirmative-antecedent and negated-consequent (“A and 
not-B”). As in Experiments 1 and 2 with counterfactuals, 
participants conclude “not A and not B,” but unlike in those 
experiments, participants also conclude the “not-A and B.” 
Therefore, the result shows that denying semifactual condi-
tionals is done in a different way from denying conditionals 
or counterfactuals. The result is also consistent with the pro-
posal that participants deny semifactuals (and counterfactu-
als) by discarding one of the two possibilities of the initial 
model: sometimes they discard the conjecture and accept 
the factual possibility “not-A and B” and at other times they 
discard the factual possibility and operate over the mutable 
model as in conditionals, concluding by the enumerative 
process, “not A and not B.” Consequently, we can conclude 
that when participants have to infer conjunctive conclusions 
from a denied counterfactual, they use a heuristic strategy 
based on the epistemic role of possibilities.
Finally, Experiment 3 has shown that there is more than 
one way of denying counterfactuals and has allowed us to 
rule out possible simple explanations. For example, the 
results in Experiments 1 and 2 were consistent with deny-
ing counterfactuals by selecting the presupposed model and 
discarding the conjectured model. However, the results were 
also consistent with the opposite: discarding the presup-
posed model and selecting the conjectured one, and there-
fore, operating as with a basic conditional. Experiment 3 has 
shown that one strategy alone cannot explain how people 
deny conditionals, as the results were consistent with two: 
people selected two conjunctive conclusions: the factual pos-
sibility (“not-A and B”) and the conjecture possibility with 
antecedent and consequent with reversed polarity (“not-A 
and not-B”).
General discussion
Experiments 1 and 2 show that participants mostly infer 
two types of conclusion from a denied/false counterfac-
tual. When they evaluate whether or not a counterfactual 
Table 4  Percentages of “yes” responses that people infer from the 
denied semifactuals (“X denied that even if they had performed 
action A, B would have happened”) in Experiment 3
Conclusion polarity: A B A not-B not-A B not-A not-B
Conclusion connective:
Semifactual 33 58 52 27
Conjunction 17 22 45 46
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conclusion follows from the denied/false counterfactual 
“X denied/X said it is false if A, then B,” they infer the 
counterfactual “if A, then not-B” more frequently than 
other counterfactual conclusions (“if A, then B,” “if not-A, 
then B,” and “if not-A, then not-B”). These results suggest 
that people use the small-scope negation strategy to infer 
what follows from a denied/false counterfactual. The use of 
the small-scope negation strategy is predicted by both the 
model theory (Khemlani et al., 2012, 2014) and the prob-
abilistic theory (Pfeifer & Tulkki, 2017). However, these 
theories offer different hypotheses in order to explain this 
result. For some authors, this conclusion is correct or valid 
(Pfeifer & Tulkki, 2017; Stalnaker, 1968), while for other 
authors, it is an incorrect conclusion (Khemlani et al., 2012, 
2014; Lewis, 1973). These results replicate those obtained 
by other authors with negated counterfactuals (Pfeifer & 
Tulkki, 2017) or negated conditionals (Espino & Byrne, 
2012; Handley et al., 2006; Khemlani et al., 2014). How-
ever, they do not allow us to determine whether people are 
reasoning correctly (Handley et al., 2006; Pfeifer & Tulkki, 
2017; Stalnaker, 1968) or wrongly (Espino & Byrne, 2012; 
Khemlani et al., 2014; Lewis, 1973). These results could not 
be explained either by Egré and Politzer (2013) or Politzer 
et al. (2020). According to these authors, the negation of “if 
A then B” is equivalent to the weak negation “if A, possibly 
not B”. They assume that this modal negation is the baseline 
negation for all indicative conditionals, but they also claim 
that the other two possible strong conclusions (such as, “if 
A, then not B’ and “A and not B”) could possibly occur, 
depending on the level of belief in the affirmative condi-
tional sentence and its antecedent. Egré and Politzer (2013) 
predicted that people would tend to use the strong conclu-
sion “if A, then not B” only if they were sufficiently doubtful 
of the conditional, and they would tend to use the strong 
conclusion “A and not B” over both conditional forms (“if 
A, it might be that not B”, or “if A, then not B”) only if they 
were sufficiently confident in the truth of the antecedent. The 
experiments we present here can neither confirm nor rule out 
the main predictions of Egré and Politzer (2013) and Politzer 
et al. (2020) for several reasons. Firstly, in our experiment 
we did not manipulate the probabilities of the conditional 
and the antecedent, which could determine whether or not 
participants favored a strong or weak conclusion. Secondly, 
the predictions of these authors refer to negated condition-
als but not to negated counterfactuals. Thirdly, even if we 
assume that denial counterfactuals behave the same way as 
denial conditionals, the fact that people accept the conjunc-
tive conclusion “not A and not B” more frequently than other 
conjunctive conclusions (Experiment 1 and Experiment 2) 
is difficult for Egré and Politzer (2013) and Politzer et al. 
(2020) to explain.
Similar results to those of Experiments 1 and 2 were 
obtained in Experiment 3, which used denied semifactuals. 
When participants have to evaluate whether or not a semifac-
tual conclusion follows from a denied semifactual “X denied 
even if A, B,” they infer the semifactual conclusion “even 
if A, not-B” and “even if not-A, B” more frequently than 
other semifactual conclusions (“even if A, B” and “even if 
not-A, not-B”). These results suggest that people use the 
small-scope negation strategy in order to infer what follows 
from a denied semifactual. However, unlike in Experiments 
1 and 2, participants apply small-scope negation strategy 
over the main clause (such as “even if A, not-B”) and over 
the subordinate clause (such as “even if not-A, B”). One 
possible explanation as to why they used the small-scope 
negation strategy over the main and subordinate clause is 
that they interpreted the semifactual as a biconditional (such 
as “X denied even if A, B” and “X denied even if not-A, 
not-B”). In the first case (“X denied even if A, B”), if partici-
pants apply the small-scope negation strategy over the main 
clause, they can infer the semifactual conclusion “even if A, 
not-B.” In the second case (“X denied even if not-A, not-
B”), if participants apply the small-scope negation strategy 
over the subordinate clause, they can infer the semifactual 
conclusion “even if not-A, B.” Espino and Byrne (2012) 
found the same pattern with negated conditionals. Another 
possible explanation is based on the fact that “even if A, then 
B” (“aunque” in Spanish) is a concessive-conditional in the 
subjunctive mood (Flamenco, 1999; König, 1986; Montolío, 
1999). To apply the small scope strategy, some participants 
might be trying to preserve the concessive character of the 
sentence, which requires them to maintain the polarity in 
the main clause (B must happen in any case). The only way 
to do this is by negating the subordinate clause (Even if not 
A, then B).
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that when they have to 
evaluate whether or not a conjunctive conclusion follows 
from a denied/false counterfactual (“X denied/X said it is 
false if A, then B”), they infer the conjunctive conclusion 
“not-A and not-B” more frequently than the other conjunc-
tive conclusions (“A and B,” “A and not-B,” and “not-A and 
B”). These results are problematic for those theories that 
claim people use the Ramsey test in order to infer a con-
clusion (Suppositional theory and Probabilistic logic). The 
Ramsey test implies that when people make inferences, they 
do not think of false antecedents (such as “not-A”), they 
only think of true antecedents (such as “A”). These results 
are also problematic for the model theory if we assume that 
participants have been thinking correctly (Byrne & Johnson-
Laird, 2020). According to the model theory, if the partici-
pants have reasoned correctly, they should judge the con-
junctive conclusion “A and not-B” as correct in the denied/
false counterfactual and semifactual conditionals. The theory 
can explain this result with conditionals based on incomplete 
enumerative processing (Khemlani et al., 2014). Participants 
start negating the two clauses and construct the “not-A and 
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not-B” case. This possibility is not represented as an initial 
model in the core meaning of a basic conditional. There-
fore, some participants could accept this possibility as the 
negation of the conditional and stop the process without 
fleshing out the implicit possibilities. However, this cannot 
be explained with regard to counterfactuals, because it is 
represented in the set of initial mental models: people rep-
resent the conjecture and the presupposed fact when they 
understand counterfactuals.
In order to explain why participants select the conclu-
sion with negated antecedent and negated consequent (i.e., 
“not-A and not-B”) from a negated counterfactual and 
semifactual, we propose that participants were using two 
possible heuristic strategies based on the epistemic role of 
possibilities. On the one hand, participants could be dis-
carding the presupposed fact from the initial representation 
and proceeding with the conjecture. This might account for 
their acceptance of the negated antecedent and consequent 
(i.e., “not-A and not-B”) after an incomplete enumerative 
process without fleshing out the implicit model, as predicted 
for conditionals. Thus, after reading that it is false that “if 
Messi had played, Barcelona would have won” a first group 
of people could direct their attention to what really happened 
(Messi did not play and Barcelona did not win), these peo-
ple could then discard the presupposed fact and proceed to 
negate the conjectured possibilities (the conjectured cases: 
Messi played and Barcelona won; Messi did not play and 
Barcelona won). Alternatively, they could be discarding 
the conjecture (e.g., Messi played and Barcelona won) and 
accepting the presupposed facts (e.g., Messi did not play and 
Barcelona did not win). The result is exactly the same: the 
acceptance of “not-A and not-B”. In both cases, the mental 
model theory could easily accommodate this result.
Why do people operate on the conjecture in the first case 
and in the second case just accept the presupposed facts? If 
they discard the presupposed facts, they are opting for a set 
of possibilities, not for a fact: there is a mutable conjectured 
possibility with other alternatives (signalled by the implicit 
model). However, if they discard the conjecture, they are 
opting for a fact. Facts are not mutable. Unfortunately, our 
research does not allow us to test what makes some people 
direct their attention to one or the other model or to use a 
different strategy. In the future, these strategies could be 
tested using comprehension tasks, obtaining reading times 
and eye-movement technics and manipulating the focus of 
the participants in the story to attend to the conjectured or 
presuppositional cases.
When participants operate with the conjectured possibil-
ity (discarding the factual possibility), they look for different 
ways to negate the clauses in the conditional (see Khem-
lani et al., 2012, 2014) starting with the negation of the 
two clauses, for example, in the negated counterfactual and 
semifactual “X denied/said it is false if/even if A, then B”, 
enumerating the “not-A and not-B” case. This possibility is 
not consistent with their representations, as the presupposed 
facts have been discarded, and therefore it is a possible solu-
tion, putting a stop to the enumerative process. Results in the 
three experiments show that this conclusion is more frequent 
than even the correct conclusion “A and not B.” Also, notice 
that unless the presupposed fact is discarded, this conclu-
sion is not predicted with counterfactuals, given that the 
“not-A and not-B” is already represented in the initial mod-
els of counterfactuals. On the other hand, when participants 
discard the conjecture, predictions for counterfactuals and 
semifactual conditionals are different: again “not-A and not-
B” is the predicted response only for counterfactuals. Results 
in Experiments 1 and 2 show that the frequency for that 
option is higher than any other. The factual possibility for 
semifactual conditionals is “not-A and B,” therefore, the two 
strategies lead to different conclusions. Accordingly, results 
in Experiment 3 show that the two predicted options are the 
most frequent conclusions with no difference between them, 
and in both cases, they are more frequent than the correct 
conclusion.
The main contributions of this research are: (1) sys-
tematic research has been carried out on how people infer 
whether or not a counterfactual/semifactual conclusion or 
conjunctive conclusion follows from denied/false counter-
factuals or semifactuals; (2) how people reason with denied 
semifactuals has been studied for the first time; (3) two heu-
ristic strategies have been proposed for how people evalu-
ate whether or not a conjunctive conclusion follows from a 
denied/false counterfactual or from a denied semifactual; 
and, finally, (4) the data from this research showed that the 
nature of the conclusion to be evaluated determines how 
people think. When participants have to evaluate whether 
or not a counterfactual/semifactual conclusion (such as, “if 
A, then not-B”) follows from a denied/false counterfactual 
(such as “X denied if A, then B” or “X said it is false that if 
A, then B”) or a denied semifactual (such as “X denied even 
if A, B”), they apply the small-scope negation strategy. On 
the other hand, when participants have to evaluate whether 
or not a conjunctive conclusion (such as “A and B”) follows 
from a denied/false counterfactual or a denied semifactual, 
they apply two heuristic strategies based on the epistemic 
role of the possibilities.
In general, the data obtained in this research can be 
explained according to the main principles (truth, parsi-
mony, dual representation, etc.) of the model theory, as 
we have shown. However, the data relative to evaluating 
whether or not a conjunctive conclusion follows from a 
denied counterfactual or semifactual are problematic for 
those theories that claim people use the Ramsey test to infer 
a conclusion (Handley et al., 2006; Pfeifer & Tulkki, 2017). 
The main problem for probabilistic theories is in assuming 
that people do not think with false antecedents when they 
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have to evaluate whether a conclusion follows from a coun-




Experiments 1 and 2 (in parenthesis)
Last year, in a conversation about football, Antonio denied 
(said it is false) that if Messi had played, Barcelona would 
have won - translated from Spanish “El año pasado en una 
conversación sobre fútbol, Antonio negó (comentó que es 
falso) que si Messi hubiera jugado, el Barcelona habría 
ganado.”
Last month in a radio interview, the vice-president of 
Madrid's government denied (said that it is false) that if the 
government had closed the border, it would have controlled 
the coronavirus - translated from Spanish “El mes pasado en 
una entrevista en la radio, el vicepresidente de gobierno de 
Madrid negó (comentó que es falso) que si el gobierno hubi-
era cerrado la frontera, habría controlado el coronavirus.”
In a television programme, one of the interviewees denied 
(said that it is false) that if the soccer clubs had invested 
more money in improving facilities, more fans would have 
attended the soccer matches - translated from Spanish “En 
un programa de televisión, uno de los entrevistados negó 
(comentó que es falso) que si los clubs de fútbol hubiesen 
invertido más dinero en mejorar las instalaciones, más afi-
cionados habrían asistido a los partidos de fútbol.”
Experiment 3
Last year in a conversation about football, Antonio denied 
that even if Messi had played, Barcelona would have won 
- translated from Spanish “El año pasado en una conver-
sación sobre fútbol, Antonio negó que aunque Messi hubiera 
jugado, el Barcelona habría ganado.”
Last month in a radio interview, the vice-president of 
Madrid's government denied that even if the government had 
closed the border, it would have controlled the coronavirus 
- translated from Spanish “El mes pasado en una entrevista 
en la radio, el vicepresidente de gobierno de Madrid negó 
que aunque el gobierno hubiera cerrado la frontera, habría 
controlado el coronavirus.”
In a television programme, one of the interviewees denied 
that even if the soccer clubs had invested more money in 
improving facilities, more fans would have attended the 
soccer matches - translated from Spanish “En un programa 
de televisión, uno de los entrevistados negó que aunque los 
clubs de fútbol hubiesen invertido más dinero en mejorar las 






“if A, B” vs. “if not-A, B”, 21% vs. 26%; F < 1
“if A, B” vs. “if not-A, not-B”: 21% vs. 33%; F(1, 51) = 
4.42, MSE = .09, p = .04, ηp 2  = .082
“if not-A, B” vs. “if not-A, not-B”: 26% vs. 33%; F(1, 51) 
= 1.07, MSE = .12, p = .31, ηp2  = .02
Conjunctive conclusions:
“A & B” vs. “A & not-B”: 19% vs. 24%; F(1, 51) = 1.08, 
MSE = .08, p = .30, ηp 2  = .022
“A & B” vs. “not-A & B”: 19% vs. 30%; F(1, 51) = 4.09, 
MSE = .09, p = .045, ηp  2  = .072
“A & not-B” vs. “not-A & B”: 24% vs. 30%; F(1, 51) = 
1.48, MSE = .06, p = .23, ηp  2  = .03
Experiment 2
Counterfactual conclusions:
“if A, B” vs. “if not-A, B”, 21% vs. 23%; F < 1
“if A, B” vs. “if not-A, not-B”: 21% vs. 25%; F(1, 49)= 
1.71, MSE = .03, p = .20, ηp 2  = .03
“if not-A, B” vs. “if not-A, not-B”: 23% vs. 25%; F < 1
Conjunctive conclusions:
“A & B” vs. “A & not-B”: 11% vs. 28%; F(1, 49) = 12.62, 
MSE = .06, p = .001, ηp 2  = .21
“A & B” vs. “not-A & B”: 11% vs. 28%; F(1, 49) = 9.40, 
MSE = .08, p = .004, ηp2  = .16
“A & not-B” vs. “not-A & B”: 28% vs. 28%; F < 1.
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